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The ethical views of Wojciech Dzieduszycki

As the professor of the Lviv University, Wojciech Dzieduszycki carried out lectures on ethics, aesthetics and history of philosophy. He perceives ethics as the philosophy of human will i.e. free and rational actions. He considers the purpose of ethics to be the reflection upon human moral duties. He claims that the key human duty is to do good and the indicator of moral good is conscience. In its conscience the human being reads the voice of God. In order to protect morality from relativism, he searched for the foundations of moral universality and objectivism, hence the intertwining of the rational arguments and revealed truths, which may place his ethics in the framework of deontological theonomy, where God is the ultimate criterion of morality.

Key words: Wojciech Dzieduszycki, the Lviv University, Galicia, ethics, human moral duties

The area of activities and interests of Count Wojciech Dzieduszycki (born in 1848 in Podolia) was truly immense. Apart from politics he was active in the scope of philosophical work,¹ university didactics, pedagogy, history of art, socio-political journalism, archaeology and conservation of historical monuments². With regard to his broad knowledge and the fascination with ancient culture, he was given the nickname “the Athenian from Podolia”. People saw him as the figure of a Greek sage, calling him the last Socrates in the Polish culture. The creator of the Lviv school of philosophy, Kazimierz Twardowski, who knew Dzieduszycki from his student times (a private teacher of his son

¹ I conducted the analysis of the philosophical works by the professor from Lviv in the book *Od epistemologii do historiozofii. Poglądy filozoficzne Wojciecha Dzieduszyckiego*, Lublin 2011; chapter in this book *Etyka dopełnieniem metafizyki* (s. 173–218) includes a comprehensive analysis of Dzieduszycki’s ethics, perceived by him as metaphysics of morality.

² Zob. S. Kieniewicz, *Dzieduszycki Wojciech* [w:] *Polski słownik biograficzny*, t. VI, s. 127.

Władysław),³ noticed that Count Wojciech possessed incredibly broad intellectual horizons.

Dzieduszycki, like most of sons of Galician aristocrats during partitions, obtained his early education in Vienna: he passed his maturity exam in the Viennese gymnasium Theresianum⁴, he studied philosophy and law at the Viennese University. In the academic period he was the president of “Ognisko” – an organisation associating Poles studying in Vienna. In 1871 he received a Ph.D. in philosophy. He obtained his habilitation in 1984 at the Lviv University and started giving lectures as an assistant professor.

Professor at the Lviv University – a philosopher, an ethicist, a teacher of the youth

In 1896 Dzieduszycki became an associate professor at the Philosophical Department of the Lviv University⁵. His lectures, both in terms of the content and the extraordinary personality of the lecturer, were extremely popular among students, for whom he was their favourite professor. Behind the facade of witty sarcasm, he displayed impeccable manners, which attracted not only students but also many well-known figures from the world of science, culture and politics.

The count from Jezupol as a lecturer of history of philosophy, conscientiously taking the role of an intellectual guide for the young, inexperienced students, set his fundamental pedagogical goal: to show those events and ideas from the distant past, which he considered to be valuable, in order to influence the further development of human thought. He also indicated those ideas and events which he considered to be faulty, thus harmful in their consequences. He deliberately applied this way of presenting past accomplishments, considering it to be the duty of a conscientious lecturer, responsible for educating new generations of intellectuals.

Being an intellectual mentor and master for his students, Dzieduszycki did not create a comprehensive system of ethics: his views on moral duties of man should be interpreted in the context of his metaphysical considerations.

³ Zob. R. Jadczyk, *Wprowadzenie* [w:] K. Twardowski, *Dzienniki 1915–1927*, Warszawa 1997, s. 10.

⁴ Kazimierz Twardowski graduated from the same gymnasium almost twenty years later.

⁵ Zob. *Kronika Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego*, t. 1: 1894/95–1897/98, Lwów 1899, s. 189, rozdz. *Kronika wydziałów. Wydział filozoficzny*: “According to the highest resolution of the 10th of June in 1986, Count Wojciech Dzieduszycki has been appointed as the associate professor of aesthetics”.

Ethics as metaphysics of morality

He considered ethics to be a philosophical science concerning human will,⁶ i.e. free and rational actions. He defined the purpose of ethics as reflection over moral duties and the necessity of performing them⁷. The subject of ethics defined in this way is morality⁸. Dziędużycki's ethical deliberations focused on searching the essence of moral good, in principle, constitute a metaphysics of morality.

Like Kant, the philosopher from Lviv, wanted to safeguard morality from relativism, looking for the foundations of its universality and objectivism, however, in a slightly different way than the thinker from Królewiec.

Dziędużycki's presentation of science of morality distinguishes several consecutive theses which at the same time constitute stages of formulating his primary ethical rule that the duty of man is to do good, while the determinant of good is conscience. This principle was deduced from the following theses: a) man by nature is a moral being (i.e. his nature is instilled with the inclination to act morally, b) morality is possible thanks to free will, c) the purpose of human life is to implement good, d) the determinant of moral good is conscience, e) implementing good (i.e. virtue) brings happiness⁹. His ethical reflection focused on pointing out the justification for these theses. He searched for their foundation in two sources: the human understanding confirmed by experience (rational justification)¹⁰ and divine revelation read by conscience as the last instance (theological justification)¹¹. Including revealed truths in the ethical substantiation was validated by the inextricable connection between morality and the existence of God¹². The combination of

⁶ W. Dziędużycki, *O wiedzy. Przedmowa*, Lwów 1895.

⁷ “[...] the necessity of fulfilling moral duty towards others is the foundation of all our convictions” (tamże, s. 197). S. Jedynek described Dziędużycki's ethics as a science of duties (*Etyka polska w latach 1863–1918*, Warszawa 1977, s. 104).

⁸ The most general philosophical ethics is defined as the science of morality, the task of which is the description and explanation of the fact of morality; see T. Styczeń, *Problem możliwości etyki*, Lublin 1971, s. 14.

⁹ “The destination and purpose of man is virtue; conscience is the milestone for virtue, it leads towards happiness, it says that happiness is possible and forces man to believe in the real world in order to achieve happiness” (W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne o podstawach pewności ludzkiej*, Lwów 1893, s. 94).

¹⁰ Tamże, s. 42.

¹¹ “But the whole certainty is based only on the absolute belief in God, innate for every man” (tamże, s. 22).

¹² “The question of the existence of God fused into moral and practical questions of utmost importance” (tamże, s. 21).

rational explanation with the obvious (for a Christian) statements acquired from God's revelation (the voice of God can be read by a man in his conscience) gave Dzieduszycki's ethics its theological character.

Man is a moral being, that is rational and free

For Dzieduszycki the existence of human morality was an axiom. The prerequisite for the existence of morality was the possession of free will¹³. In the deterministic world of nature only man has free will, which is confirmed by his deeply rooted conviction about the interrelation of freedom and morality in human nature¹⁴.

Contrary to Kant, who considered freedom to be only a postulate of practical reason,¹⁵ Dzieduszycki claimed that human conviction about freedom is not a postulate but a fact confirmed by experience, which shows that people in most cases act not under the pressure of psychological necessity but with the awareness of the possibility of choice. The very notion of freedom itself entails, in Dzieduszycki's opinion, the belief that a man is a moral being, i.e. rational and free¹⁶. This conviction about being free makes a man a moral being, i.e., as defined by Dzieduszycki, a being who feels obliged to perform his moral duties towards himself and other people¹⁷.

He rejected biological determinists' doubts as to the possibility of occurrence of rational and moral deeds. He thought that everyday experience confirms that human actions are free and autonomous acts, which are not determined by the result of external consequences¹⁸. Contrary to the material world, in the spiritual world, which, according to Dzieduszycki, included the human

¹³ "But morality is only possible where there is free will" (tamże).

¹⁴ M.A. Krąpiec (*Ludzka wolność i jej granice*, Lublin 2000, s. 7) in this case speaks of the presumption of freedom.

¹⁵ According to Kant, theoretical reason cannot decide whether there is freedom in the world or determination, however, practical reason commands the assumption of freedom of will; see e.g. R. Kozłowski, *Wolność fundamentem etyki kantowskiej* [w:] *Filozofia Kanta i jej recepcja*, red. nauk. R. Kozłowski, Poznań 2006, s. 69–74.

¹⁶ Zob. W. Dzieduszycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 52. This conviction was explained *expressis verbis* by M.A. Krąpiec (*Ludzka wolność i jej granice*, Lublin 2000, s. 8): "the most eminent thinkers located human morality in free acts of man, as corroborated by the works by Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Hartman, Scheller and others".

¹⁷ "Act for the others, sacrifice yourself for the others. This commandment of love is the main content, the only content of morality" (W. Dzieduszycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 73).

¹⁸ This negation of determinism should not be understood as indeterminism in the sense of randomness of freedom, bridled by nothing (see e.g. M.A. Krąpiec, *Indeterminizm i determinizm w procesach wolności wyboru* [w:] tegoż, *Ludzka wolność i jej granice*, s. 12–17).

kind, the operation of natural laws is limited by man's will¹⁹. Dziędużycki rejected the deterministic argument of God's predestination²⁰ by stating that God's omniscience does not limit human freedom: it does not operate in the world of a historic being but belongs to the metaphysical God²¹.

He amplified the arguments for the existence of freedom through the metaphor of God as an artist who imagined the universe as a stage of his life, with people being actors of his creation²². Referring to the analogy of the world and a literary work, he noticed that the higher the class of the artist, the more autonomous *dramatis personae* are: in the work of a true master, all characters of the drama act not out of subjugation to the plot, but out of motives resulting from their nature as free beings, while in an author of lower quality, all actions, thoughts and words of depicted persons are determined by the intended purpose of the work with the characters being only puppets on strings pulled by the author²³. The above analogy leads to the conclusion that God cannot be perceived as a mediocre creator: he is a true artist since in his masterpiece people are not puppets but free beings – such is the nature of the universe, a poem conceived by God. The purpose of this poem is to implement moral perfection by its protagonists²⁴.

The implementation of moral good as the purpose of human life

Dziędużycki described man and his moral actions by means of teleological explanation²⁵, which he based on the Aristotelian thesis that a given thing

¹⁹ “[...] necessity rules only in the sensory world, the operation of the law is sometimes limited by freedom in the spiritual world” (W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 49).

²⁰ Dziędużycki presented this argument in an ironic way: “so I am not guilty of my sins and I do not deserve merit for my virtues, it is God that is the perpetrator of every sin and every moral deed” (tamże, s. 51).

²¹ “[...] God's omniscience does not interfere with human freedom” (tamże, s. 54).

²² “I have imagined God in the image of a poet who conceived the world as a stage of his poem, while limited souls – as the actors of his poem. I will look closer at this comparison” (tamże s. 53). The analogy of the world and the artist creating his work is derived from Aristotle; it was also used by Saint Augustine.

²³ Zob. tamże, s. 53.

²⁴ “Achieving moral perfection is the purpose of the poem, [...] living people, endowed with free will, without which perfection would be impossible, are the actors of the story, where the world of phenomena and events ruled by the law is the theatre where the story takes place” (tamże, s. 54).

²⁵ Just for the record: mechanistic explanation of organisms by ancient physiologists was overcome by Aristotle by indicating the purpose as the reason for existence. The discovery of

or phenomenon can only be understood when we discover their purpose of operation. He stressed the teleological aspect especially that his times were the period of intensification of the tendency to reduce the purposefulness of human actions to utilitarian ones or to certain pre-determined conventions. He saw the source of the conviction about man's purposefulness in the world in his inner experience²⁶. He claimed that human life – in a way similar to the existence of all beings and the whole world – is subjected to a specific purpose, thus accepting the fact of purposeful activity in the world, according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.

After Kant (who identified the purpose of man with the highest good²⁷), he considered the implementation of moral good, i.e. achieving virtue, to be the proper purpose of man. In his line of argument, he assumed that any purposefulness requires belief in intelligence which has determined this purpose. As far as the consciousness of purpose is concerned, man is different from animals, plants and creations of inanimate nature in that he is endowed with self-knowledge of what he is trying to achieve. He noticed that in this way human striving becomes desire²⁸. Man by nature wants and has to pursue an aim²⁹. Dzieduszycki claimed that the way in which each man is instilled with the belief in the existence of morality can be compared to the manner in which he is instilled with the conviction about his purpose, indicating which tasks, by force of his being, man is called to perform³⁰. An example of such a task is, in Dzieduszycki's opinion, the sense of duty which forces man to implement moral good. He thought that the awareness of duty is born in a man along with

final cause in the explanation of the world (apart from the material, formal and efficient ones) is deemed to be one of the most significant accomplishments of the Stagirite. M.A. Krąpiec reminds that the purposefulness of beings was discovered in Greek thought last but was questioned first: already in the Middle Ages purpose was mistakenly seen as the motive of particular actions but not as one common purpose of all actions undertaken by a man; por. M.A. Krąpiec, *Ludzka wolność i jej granice*, s. 192.

²⁶ “[...] the notion of purposefulness is derived from the same inner experience which teaches us about the existence of free will” (W. Dzieduszycki, *O wiedzy*, s. 158).

²⁷ “That virtue [...] is the supreme good, has already been proved in analytics” (I. Kant, *Krytyka praktycznego rozumu*, tłum. J. Gałęcki, Warszawa 1984, s. 180).

²⁸ Zob. W. Dzieduszycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 92.

²⁹ In the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition the conformity of actions with nature constitutes a criterion of moral value of an action, with the reservation that in Aristotle it was the final criterion, while in Thomas Aquinas it was relatively ultimate since he assumed that the eternal intention of God implemented into human nature is the absolutely ultimate moral criterion; por. T. Styczeń, *Zarys etyki*, cz. I: *Metaetyka*, Lublin 1974, s. 61.

³⁰ M.A. Krąpiec states in a similar vein (*Ludzka wolność i jej granice*, s. 9): “The most prominent manifestation of human freedom is the moral actions of man, i.e. simply human activity, realising good or evil of human deeds.”

the conviction about having free will³¹. This conviction originates, like in Kant,³² without the participation of sensory experience. In Kantian spirit, Dziędużycki placed sense of duty in the highest position in the hierarchy of human activity³³. He valued it more than any other human sensory desire, and even more than the spiritual ones.

Dziędużycki stated that the sense of duty unconditionally compels a man to pursue good as a goal³⁴, considering the terms of “doing good” and “acting virtuously” to be synonymous, as good and virtue are identical³⁵. In Kant’s ethics, reason, as a cognitive instance, gives only a formal command to perform good deeds,³⁶ while Dziędużycki attempted to fill this command with specific content, searching for the answer to the question: what is the content of this moral command?

³¹ “With the conviction about free will constituting the only exception for the spirit in the whole universe bridled by the inescapable law, a clear awareness of duty emerges, not an ambiguous one: it is a witness of what the spirit is called for by force of a living being” (W. Dziędużycki, *O wiedzy*, s. 201).

³² An excerpt from I. Kant (*Krytyka praktycznego rozumu*, s. 256): “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe [...]: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were veiled obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.”

³³ Struve writes about the significance of sense of duty in Dziędużycki’s ethical system: “Dziędużycki bases the certainty of God’s existence, the immortality of soul and freedom of will on the conviction about moral duty, following Kant in this respect. But he does not call this certainty, based on Kant, a rational *faith* but knowledge.” He accuses Dziędużycki of a fallacy that in this way he removed the Kantian opposition between knowledge and faith: “he did not notice that the simple shift of the term *faith* for *knowledge* does not solve the whole issue.” (H. Struve, *Historia logiki jako teorii poznania w Polsce*, Warszawa 1911, s. 367).

³⁴ Cf. W. Dziędużycki, *O wiedzy*, s. 201. Combining the freedom of man with striving for good, based on the conviction that will is determined by the recognized good, occurred in philosophy already in ancient times, and in morality since its inception. This conviction was expressed in the following way by M.A. Krąpiec (*Ludzka wolność i jej granice*, s. 12): “The primacy of will, its autonomy in selection of its acts is related with the evangelical truth about God as Love and the Platonic concept of good as the spontaneously disseminating emanation – *bonum est diffusivum sui* – which was specified by Thomas Aquinas by the sentence: *per modum quo finis dicitur movere*, so it operates by means of the final cause and not the efficient one”.

³⁵ According to stoics, both good and virtue are the expression of an attitude of a man, who acts in accordance with his own reason, which is the manifestation of God’s reason.

³⁶ Kant claimed that an act is morally good when it results from the command of the acting person. Moral commands of reason are not motivated by any content but are the creation of its spontaneous creative activity (apriorism). This aprioric command given by the reason was called by Kant the categorical imperative. Following the imperative, a man is obedient to himself since the only motive that drives him is the respect for his imperative (ethical formalism). To explain this morality, Kant claims that it is necessary to move beyond empiricism and to build ethics based on aprioric premises, which results in the concept of pure practical reason: see Z. Kuderowicz, *Filozofia nowożytnej Europy*, Warszawa 1989, s. 514–515.

Describing moral good as *per negationem*, he rejected the utilitarian statement that good is what allows an individual to fight for existence, where good was identified with usefulness and a good man with a man prevailing in the fight for existence and preservation of the human kind³⁷. Defining moral good in positive terms, he stated, in Augustinian spirit, that it is love. He considered love to be the main content of moral good, the basis of morality and the highest of virtues, thus supplementing the old Greek eudaimonism (duty to perform an act with regard to satisfaction which it brings) with the Christian ethics of love³⁸.

After Saint Augustine, Dzieduszycki claimed that love is rooted in the essence of man, which is proven by our deepest feeling that we should love others equally to our own selves and by the fact that we can find the source of happiness in this very feeling. The Lviv philosopher thought that we do not deduce which laws of logic justify this conviction, but we take it for granted. In this way, the conviction about the duty to love others broadens the scope of beliefs, which, according to Dzieduszycki, man considers to be obvious and not a result of a deduction.

He expressed his view that the religious commandment of love did not lose its significance even in this times when the word “love” was replaced by the fashionable word “altruism”³⁹. However, he noticed the cause-and-effect relation between love and happiness, claiming that the stronger love a man feels, the happier he is. The increase in the mutual love between neighbours was, in his opinion, the content of the historic progress of humanity⁴⁰ (this conviction became the axis of his concept of history formulated in later years).

Dzieduszycki's ethics can be described as theonomic since he assumed that God, the source and norm of good, is the personal relation between man and personal God-Love⁴¹: “Good is what God wants, God is perfect, God is good and our duty is to make his intent real”⁴². It is difficult to judge whether he made this ethical profession of faith as a philosopher for whom religious sanction is equal in justification to rational argumentation, or as a “very pious

³⁷ Zob. Dzieduszycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 71.

³⁸ Por. T. Styczeń, *Zarys etyki*, cz. I: *Metaetyka*, Lublin 1974, s. 55 “Christianity [...] recognising the dignity of a person as the sufficient reason for the duty of its affirmation, determines the adequate notion of moral duty, by formulating the chief principles of ethics, i.e. the categorical imperative expressed in love, defined as a personalistic norm.”

³⁹ Zob. W. Dzieduszycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 73–74.

⁴⁰ “The content of historic progress is the fact that people love themselves more and more” (tamże, s. 74).

⁴¹ As opposed to the Platonic concept of impersonal good.

⁴² Tamże, s. 83.

man”, as ironically remarked once by Malebranche,⁴³ or maybe for another reason. In any case, looking for the source and essence of moral good, Dziędużycki-philosopher entered the field of theology, indicating, as a Christian, the content known from God’s revelation, which he would have to be still looking for as a philosopher⁴⁴. T. Styczeń noticed that the influence of Christianity was manifested most in those philosophers who, being rooted in one of the currents of ancient classical philosophy, combined them with revealed truths⁴⁵. A classic example is Saint Augustine, whose thought was a source of immense inspiration for Dziędużycki.

Love is the basic virtue, he stated in Augustine spirit (according to Saint Augustine virtue is the order in the scope of love – “an order of heart”, *ordo amoris*)⁴⁶ – but it does not fulfil it completely. An essential part of virtue is truth. The Lviv professor repeating the Fichtean dilemma “whether cognition has to be subjugated to love or love to cognition”,⁴⁷ considered whether also scientific investigation of truth remains in close relation with love. He distinguished “intellectual love”, defining it as a desire for truth and beauty. This kind of longing leads to the desire for goodness⁴⁸. However, strictly speaking, the truth scientist are looking for is frequently indifferent from the point of view of love⁴⁹. That is why, although searching for truth is the duty of man, it is not the primary duty⁵⁰. The main duty of a man does not consist only in succumbing to rational thinking but in the activities leading to the implementation of good⁵¹. It is an explicit declaration as to the hierarchy of values: good is the highest in this ranking along with the necessity of its implementation in human actions.

⁴³ “Malebranche wanted only to praise God and his omnipresence by means of his hypothesis since it was a very pious man: however, he became the reason why the most godless philosophy since time immemorial was created; [...] the teachings of Malebranche’s, like Plato’s and Saint Anselm’s, lead, despite its panache, straight to pantheism, the most complete expression of which is Spinoza’s teachings.” (W. Dziędużycki, *Wykłady o pierwszej filozofii*, s. 56).

⁴⁴ Por. T. Styczeń, *Zarys etyki*, s. 56: “So Christianity has influence on the shape of ethical theory, showing moralist philosophers (ethicists), from their own resources, the ultimate reason for morality: God as Creative Love. It also brings closer the direct reason for morality: man.”

⁴⁵ T. Styczeń, *Zarys etyki*, s. 56.

⁴⁶ Por. np. S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje europejskiej filozofii klasycznej*, Warszawa–Wrocław 2000, s. 344.

⁴⁷ J.G. Fichte (*Powołanie człowieka*, Warszawa 2003, s. 54) answered his question: “I cannot remain undecided – my whole peace and my whole dignity depends on the answer to this question. [...] I have no basis to decide on one or the other.”

⁴⁸ W. Dziędużycki, *Rzecz o uczuciach ludzkich*, Lwów 1902, s. 60.

⁴⁹ Zob. tenże, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 74–75.

⁵⁰ Zob. tamże, s. 77.

⁵¹ Zob. tamże, s. 83.

At the same time he indicated the dependence of human actions on the mind. Since the purpose of human actions is the fulfilment of mankind and it can occur by means of virtuous deeds, only such deeds can be deemed to be truly rational. He posed a didactic question based on this juxtaposition of reason and virtue: what is higher – reason (contemplative) or virtue, i.e. does reason serve virtue or the other way round: virtue serves reason? He stated that according to God's intention, virtue (as a result of the cognition of practical and theoretical reason) is higher than contemplative reason. Such hierarchisation of relations between contemplative reason and virtue transferred to the plane of life, led to the question: who deserves a bigger recognition – a man having a comprehensive theoretical education but morally depraved or a noble man but deprived of the resources of theoretical knowledge? On the basis of the above declarations, it seems obvious that the Lviv philosopher-moralist dignified a noble man despite his lack of theoretical knowledge. He thought that an educated theoretician, with moral defects has to be left in the shadow, so that the noble man can lead the way. He concluded that moral depravity is more incriminating when it concerns a man with a comprehensive knowledge since he is expected to have a higher awareness of moral good and evil⁵².

The effects of cognition of the practical reason, not resulting from human nobility (virtue), in his opinion, should be attributed rather to being cunning and shrewd than wise. He stated that only after a man has truly recognised what is the essential purpose in human life, can the practical reason become what it should be. A man having developed practical reason, so a man rational in practice but without virtue, will not be a beautiful man since true reason cannot be reason which is deprived of virtue: "A man who is truly virtuous is always a truly reasonable man. [...] He can be helpless with regard to short-term goals, not related to the implementation of the idea of man, he may not be competent in the matter of sciences but he still can be wise as he knows the content of God's idea and measures leading to its fulfilment"⁵³.

He stressed the necessity and, at the same time, the privilege, of every man to take the choice of intended actions⁵⁴ and the resulting moral responsibility⁵⁵. Man is responsible for all his actions and he cannot dispose of this

⁵² "[...] a learned scoundrel will be the more hideous the more learned he will be" (tamże, s. 27).

⁵³ Tamże, s. 29.

⁵⁴ "Man can perform his duty or to oppose it, prioritising the short-lived, but easier to obtain delight over the supreme delight but so difficult to achieve, i.e. virtue, devotion and heroism" (W. Dzieduszycki, *O wiedzy*, s. 201).

⁵⁵ "Man has two paths ahead, one shown by the partially rational knowledge and by this undeveloped love which we call self-centredness, and the other one shown to him by the infallible conscience. He can choose between these two paths [...]. His duty is to choose correctly, it is his obedience to the voice of his conscience" (tenże, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 100).

responsibility⁵⁶. The Lviv moralist pointed out that there are no indifferent actions – whatever we do, it will influence the moral fate of other people.

Establishing man's conviction that it is necessary to fulfil the human duty, i.e. to do good, is, according to Dziędużycki, the essence of education. If compared to the primary task of education, the principles regulating man's behaviour in particular circumstances were of secondary importance to him⁵⁷.

He perceived the intellectual capacity of man, in Aristotelian spirit, as the theoretical reason (contemplative) and as the practical reason⁵⁸. The function of discovering vital goals of man was attributed to contemplative reason, while the function of searching for means thanks to which these goals can be achieved – to practical reason⁵⁹. Dziędużycki saw the main goal of the contemplative reason in the recognition of the ideal of man, while the practical reason – the ability to choose means leading to this ideal⁶⁰.

Conscience as the criterion for moral good

Taking into consideration the issues of moral good, Dziędużycki assumed that God, in order to allow man to fulfil the aim in the form of moral good (virtue), equipped him with the special ability to differentiate between what is good and what is evil. This ability, as in the case of any truth, is intuition capable of reading truths in human conscience⁶¹.

He polemised with the utilitarian statement that education is the foundation of conscience. He claimed that education only strengthens the natural knowledge embedded in us helping to determine whether some deeds are good and some are evil. The conviction about the need to do good is inborn in every person, also in those who have not obtained moral education. The voice of conscience is independent of the influence of education⁶². In this view it is possible

⁵⁶ Zob. tenże, *O wiedzy*, s. 202.

⁵⁷ Zob. tamże, s. 69.

⁵⁸ "Reason can be twofold: theoretical, i.e. contemplative or practical" (W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 27).

⁵⁹ "Reason [practical – added by T.Z.] is a skill of selecting means leading to happiness" (tamże, s. 89).

⁶⁰ "The true contemplative reason is knowing the essence of virtue, while the true practical reason is the ability to select means leading to virtue. All other alleged reasons are not reasons but stupidity" (W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 28).

⁶¹ "In this way, contemplating ethical issues led us again to brooding over the significance of conscience [...], reminding us that the ultimate criterion of truth lies within it" (W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 26).

⁶² Por. tamże, s. 70.

to discern the resounding echo of Rousseau's "natural religion"⁶³. After Jean-Jacques, the Lviv philosopher indicated that there are situations when moral ideals are pursued by a man who has not received moral education, but still the dictate of his conscience is strong. This fact, in Dzieduszycki's opinion, confirms the conviction that the voice of conscience is innate (and "will not be denied by anybody serious"⁶⁴).

Conscience, in Dzieduszycki's conception, the criterion for any truth, is also the criterion in the scope of moral truth (moral good): "conscience by all necessity persuades me that I **should** [underlined by T.Z] act rationally and morally"⁶⁵.

According to the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, it is not strictly conscience as the judgement of the practical reason deciding about the moral value of a particular deed (the so-called actual conscience) but the so-called habitual conscience (pre-conscience, synderesis⁶⁶), understood as the innate (natural) infallible predilection to know the original moral principles, still allowing the actual conscience to function⁶⁷.

In Dzieduszycki's opinion, the most general truth discovered by conscience is the truth compelling to do good. This truth can be legitimately compared to the Thomistic principle of *bonum est faciendum* (revealed by synderesis)⁶⁸ and, according to it, accepted as the fundamental principle of the natural law⁶⁹. In this way, for Dzieduszycki, conscience would be the spokesman for the natural law. It could be also juxtaposed with the Kantian objective law of the practical reason, which in *Critique of Practical Reason* was described as follows: "the only objects of practical reason are therefore those of good and evil"⁷⁰.

Dzieduszycki stated that the essence of conscience is the dictate that a man should do good, while casuistic rules commanding specific behaviour in

⁶³ For the elaboration of Rousseau's natural religion, see e.g.: B. Russell, *Dzieje filozofii Zachodu*, Warszawa 2002, s. 788–795.

⁶⁴ W. Dzieduszycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 70.

⁶⁵ Tamże, s. 15.

⁶⁶ "Synderesis is the natural ability of human reason, thanks to which a man can read the original principles concerning our practical activities, which, from the beginning, direct these activities towards good as the ultimate goal – *bonum est faciendum* ("good should be done"). [...] Synderesis as an ability improves the intellectual capacity in the area of practical cognition" (A. Maryniarczyk, *Czym jest synderesa? Analiza pierwszego artykułu kwestii De synderesis* [w:] Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, *De conscientia. O sumieniu*, tłum. A. Białek, red. nauk. A. Maryniarczyk, Lublin 2010, s. 97).

⁶⁷ Por. A. Szostek, *Normy i wyjątki*, Lublin 1980, s. 33.

⁶⁸ Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, *Suma teologiczna*, I–II, q. 94, a. 2, resp.

⁶⁹ For the relation of synderesis with the natural law see K. Stępień, *Synderesa a prawo naturalne* [w:] Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, *De conscientia. O sumieniu*, s. 129–145.

⁷⁰ I. Kant, *Krytyka praktycznego rozumu*, s. 97

particular circumstances are of secondary importance⁷¹. According to the Thomistic interpretation of morality, this function is performed by synderesis, which is first in the logical order (before conscience), since thanks to it conscience knows that the basic dictate is to strive for good. It is synderesis that conscience draws its normative power from. Specific dictates of conscience in a particular realisation of this good are only derivative. The same conviction was held by Dziędużycki when he stated that conscience is not the source of specific moral norms but constitutes the basis for strengthening them. To a lesser extent, conscience is the act of a subject, but, to a larger extent, the reader of the dictate encoded within it. It is the ultimate norm of morality and an objective norm (and, not as in Thomists, an ultimately subjective norm, regulated by the nature of reality⁷²).

For Dziędużycki conscience establishes a moral norm of general importance, i.e. one which requires obedience from every man everywhere and all the time⁷³. At first glance, it seems that Dziędużycki's stand, similar to Kant's, is convergent with autonomous deontologism,⁷⁴ where the moral norm is seen as the conformity with the dictate of inner authority. However, in Kant, the dictate is derived directly from and only from reason, while in Dziędużycki, directly from conscience and indirectly from God, whose commands are the content of conscience. He justified the absolute reliability on the dictates of conscience by the fact that they are endowed directly from God⁷⁵: “conscience is what we call the command given to us by God, **demanding** [underlined by T.Z.] that we should achieve our goal and to fulfil God's plan

⁷¹ W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 69.

⁷² For conscience as the ultimate norm of morality see T. Styczeń, *Etyka niezależna?*, Lublin 1980, p. 50: “Not only Kant, but already traditional ethics proclaimed the autonomy of the subject in the thesis that conscience is the ultimate judgement or act of cognition. It obliges us not because this judgement is our own and ours only, made solely by us but that it is a announcement about what is compulsory for us as subjects. The judgement by itself does not create moral necessity. It only makes this message known to the subject.”

⁷³ Por. A. Szostek, *Normy i wyjątki*, s. 15–16.

⁷⁴ Kant's ethics is described as autonomous deontologism, being a reaction to eudaimonism and also to theonomic deontologism. Kant rejected eudaimonism since selflessness belongs to the essence of moral good not because it leads to happiness. Heteronomism, in turn, was rejected as Kant identified actions according to inner convictions with actions according to external command. He thought that the essential feature of a morally good deed is its compliance with its inner conviction, which is not guaranteed by heteronomism. It is believed that Kant has not overcome deontologism but he replaced the previous form with another variety (an act is still considered to be good because it is the result of a command, except that it is an external one). In Kant there is no question about the reason for which a particular deed is commanded (why a given act is morally good); see T. Styczeń, *Zarys etyki*, s. 68–69.

⁷⁵ W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 49.

by becoming virtuous”⁷⁶. In the above statement he focused on the imperative nature of the dictates of conscience: conscience not just advises but demands.

Since the voice of conscience is perceived as God’s will read by man, such ethics is located within theonomic deontologism where God is the ultimate criterion of morality⁷⁷. And it is probably the most accurate meta-ethical categorisation of Dzieduszycki’s ethical conception.

Moral good (virtue) as the condition of happiness

Dzieduszycki, in line with Socrates and Kant, stated that moral good (virtue) brings happiness to man (still it is not identical with happiness), while desire for happiness is instilled in the nature of man⁷⁸. Every man desires happiness and strives to achieve it, hence all his actions have to aim at the fulfilment of happiness⁷⁹: “striving for happiness is an indispensable necessity; it is impossible to imagine a man who does not strive to achieve it”⁸⁰. Striving for happiness as a goal is the basic fact of human existence. Dzieduszycki thought that it is impossible to imagine a man who does not endeavour to achieve happiness. Even an ascetic, avoiding worldly happiness, cultivates his abstinence since he hopes that in this way he will achieve happiness greater than the worldly one⁸¹. The perception of happiness as a goal for a man is compatible with the Aristotelian-Thomistic teleologism⁸².

⁷⁶ Tamże, s. 31.

⁷⁷ Por. T. Styczeń, *Zarys etyki*, s. 63–64. Styczeń thinks that deontologism in all its varieties is a (failed) attempt at explaining the absolute validity of moral duty and the reaction to ethical eudaimonism. Styczeń perceives the crux of the matter with deontologism to be the question: is a given deed morally good because it was commanded or is a given deed commanded because it is morally good? Accepting the latter option leads to personalism which sees the reason for moral duty in the dignity of a person that in itself deserves affirmation (tamże).

⁷⁸ “In the highest good for us, the practical good, i.e. one implemented through our will, happiness and virtue will be manifested in our thoughts as necessarily combined with one another” (I. Kant, *Krytyka praktycznego rozumu*, s. 184).

⁷⁹ “A duty may only be the striving for lasting happiness, to the highest possible sum of happiness, where a virtuous man or rather a reasonable one, would be a man able to devote short-lived happiness for lasting happiness. In this sense there is no contradiction in the sentence that the duty of man is to strive for happiness” (W. Dzieduszycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 91).

⁸⁰ Tamże.

⁸¹ Zob. tamże.

⁸² Por. A. Szostek, *Normy i wyjątki*, Lublin 1980, s. 19: “happiness constitutes the ultimate subjective goal, which a man strives to achieve out of necessity, while the only objective goal, giving such happiness is God. By highlighting that only God can give perfect and full happiness to a man, Thomism opposed those theories according to which a man can reach full happiness available to him in the worldly life.”

Trying to formulate the definition of happiness, Dziędużycki distanced himself from the method of defining it through the analysis of cases in which a man feels happy,⁸³ which he found fruitless. In order to create an adequate definition of happiness, it is necessary to generalise situations in which a man tends to be happy as we tend to be happy when, in any discipline, “we are coming closer to achieving our goal delineated by God”⁸⁴. In this manner, not deviating from the spirit of Thomism⁸⁵, he identified man’s happiness with the implementation of his goal indicated by God.

The consequence of the essence of happiness is that it has to concern a specific man. This prerequisite applies to both sensory and spiritual happiness. In Dziędużycki’s opinion, any “general happiness”, different from the personal one is not possible.

The biggest contribution to a man’s happiness and his improvement is made by love since only thanks to love a man grows spiritually, as testified by the Lviv moralist. Within the concept of love, he situated love for the other person, love for one’s fatherland and love for God. Love is necessary for the development of man and decides about his spiritual beauty. Dziędużycki reminded that “the sober and reasonable Aristotle” stated that only a rational man can be beautiful (in the sense of spiritual beauty) and can deserve respect. Contrary to the Stagirite, the Athenian from Jezupol thought that a man is fully beautiful when and only when he can love since “true great love that is capable of guessing other people’s thoughts and feelings, becomes wiser than the most astute but selfish reason”⁸⁶. He indicated that the sensory beauty of man is sufficient to evoke attraction for him, however, a permanent reason for love is usually spiritual beauty, which still can take various forms. Dziędużycki stated that we are attracted to very rational people or those in possession of free will, however, the biggest attraction is evoked by those who are inclined to show sympathy to others. As a result, he concluded that a rational man, en-

⁸³ The analysis of situations in which a man feels happy, was applied by W. Tatarkiewicz as one of the ways to define happiness in his book *O szczęściu* (Warszawa 1962).

⁸⁴ W. Dziędużycki, *Roztrząsania filozoficzne*, s. 5.

⁸⁵ Por. A. Szostek, *Normy i wyjątki*, s. 20: “to acknowledge that the ultimate objective goal of both man and the whole world is God, implies the presumption of the basic rationality of the world, in which a rational plan of its Creator is revealed. Consequently, it can be said that the Divine Reason (*divina sapientia vel ratio*) constitutes the ultimate norm of morality [the objective/further one; the objective/closer norm of morality is the rational human nature – a comment by T.Z.]” Conscience (in its strict definition) as the act of practical reason, constitutes, in turn, the ultimate subjective norm of morality. The content of the judgment of conscience depends on the recognised objective norm of morality (tamże). A. Szostek describes the relation of human nature and conscience as the relation of *norma normans* (normative norm) to *norma normata* (normalised norm).

⁸⁶ W. Dziędużycki, *Wzruszenia patetyczne*, Lwów 1900, s. 13.

dowed with a strong will but uncontaminated with coldness of heart, refraining himself from showing sympathy for others, can be the object of admiration but not the object of love (he argued that it is the devil himself who symbolises a wise spirit with strong will but devoid of love, therefore a spirit whose intended spiritual beauty was squandered). He considered the balance of love, reason and will to be the ideal state of mankind.

According to the stoic slogan of general kindness but also to the Christian commandment of love for one's neighbour, he stated that being occupied only with oneself and one's own feelings and neglecting the needs and feelings of other people is often the reason for dissatisfaction with one's own fate, regardless of how favourable the external living conditions of a particular person could be. As a consequence, he advised that, in order to be happy, "it is necessary to take care of something else than one's own self"⁸⁷. However, not every kind of occupation with oneself can become a source of happiness since he indicated that it is possible to become occupied with something or somebody out of hatred or jealousy; then happiness will be unreachable. Happiness is experienced only when actions are undertaken out of empathy and love, but not out of every type of compassion: only one which refers to entities having "their own spirituality," i.e. persons (so with the exclusion of inanimate objects and animals)⁸⁸. Similarly, in case of feelings towards abstract things: "he who says that he loves science, does not feel the emotion of love in its proper sense; by saying that we love science, we express ourselves incorrectly; we should say that we deal with science with fondness"⁸⁹. By assuming that the feeling expressed with the word "love" in its literal proper sense can only be attributed to persons, he distanced himself from using it in any analogical sense.

However, it does not mean that he did not notice the effects of being engaged in scientific activity, so beneficial for man. He stated that "dealing with science with fondness brings us triple benefit: being engrossed in scientific investigations we forget about ourselves, thus getting rid of our egoism; what is more, we enrich our knowledge, which brings us joy and benefits; finally, we overcome difficulties related with reaching the truth, which is our victory. In these cases we should speak of fondness but not about love in its proper sense"⁹⁰.

Objections which he had to the issue of unauthorised use of the word "love" did not refer to feelings towards ideas and tradition, which he saw as true love and in many cases he even thought of them as feelings higher and

⁸⁷ Tenże, *O wiedzy*, s. 109.

⁸⁸ "Only the love of other spirits, aware of themselves, is a spiritual duty" (tamże, s. 191).

⁸⁹ Tamże.

⁹⁰ Tamże, s. 192.

nobler than love felt towards another person. We love tradition because we love those who created this tradition; tokens of tradition remind us of them: “the most sacred and the most nobly beloved are the national or religious tokens and traditions, i.e. those which remind us a lot of the idea of love for the whole nation, for the whole humanity [...]. Such tokens, such traditions are dear and beautiful, and sacred because they transform beautiful, great and sacred love into a more powerful, greater and warmer being”⁹¹.

He valued love for ideas highly, claiming that the reason for loving an idea is the fact that it can serve the good and happiness of many people, the nation or mankind. He argued that by loving an idea, we love these people. Such a love is, in his opinion, the closest to the ideal of mankind and brings joy greater than the one given by love limited to selected people.

Philosophy in the post-partition Poland, obviously apart from the emigration circles in Paris, developed mainly at universities in Cracow and Warsaw. Lviv, despite having a vibrant academic centre, until the times of the Lviv-Warsaw school of Kazimierz Twardowski, was not particularly famous. It seems justified to put forward the thesis that Dziędużycki’s works fill the gap between the Jagiellonian University and the Warsaw University, and, through the figure of Józef Kremer, the first master and patron of Dziędużycki as a student, they can actually be derived from the Cracow environment, inspiring the Lviv environment, but leave Lviv thanks to the philosophers Twardowski and Tatarkiewicz, to finally join the scope of the Warsaw philosophy, coming full circle of Cracow, Lviv and Warsaw.

The philosophical works by Dziędużycki and his sociopolitical activity in the geopolitical dimension took place in Galicia, within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, he was related with the national culture intellectually and emotionally. Dziędużycki felt Podolian but, first of all, Polish. Although he spent a significant part of his life in Galicia – in Lviv, in Podolia and in Vienna, the capital of his fatherland was Warsaw.

Conclusion

Dziędużycki perceived ethics as a philosophical science concerning human will, i.e. free and rational actions. He considered reflection over moral duties of man to be the aim of ethics. For him the basic duty of man is to perform good deeds, which is why the search for the essence of moral good is the core of his ethics. He considered love to be the main content of moral good, and the implementation of love – the goal of human life. He deemed man to be

⁹¹ Tamże.

a moral being, i.e. a free and rational one, while the ideal state for humanity – the balance of love, reason and will.

In an attempt to find the grounds for universality and objectivism of morality, in his ethical justifications, he combined rational arguments with revealed statements, thus situating ethics within theonomic deontology where God is the ultimate criterion of morality manifested in the voice of human conscience.

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Wojciecha Dziędaszycy poglądy etyczne

Streszczenie

Jako profesor Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego Wojciech Dziędaszycy prowadził wykłady z etyki, estetyki i historii filozofii. Etykę pojmował jako filozoficzną naukę dotyczącą ludzkiej woli, czyli wolnego i rozumnego działania. Za cel etyki uważał namysł nad obowiązkami moralnymi człowieka. Twierdził, że zasadniczym obowiązkiem człowieka jest czynienie dobra, a wyznacznikiem dobra jest sumienie. W swoim sumieniu człowiek odczytuje głos Boga. Aby zabezpieczyć moralność przed relatywizmem, szukał podstaw jej uniwersalności i obiektywizmu. Stąd łączenie w uzasadnieniach etycznych argumentów rozumowych z twierdzeniami objawionymi, przez co jego etyka została usytuowana w ramach deontologizmu teonomicznego, gdzie to Bóg jest ostatecznym kryterium moralności.

Słowa kluczowe: Wojciech Dziędaszycy, Uniwersytet Lwowski, Galicja, etyka, obowiązki moralne człowieka