

Summary

In the first part of the thesis, I presented a theory of properties, whose aim was to create an adequate conceptual basis for further ontological considerations, and in particular for considering the nature and status of transcendentals. The most important results of the first part are:

1. Axiomatic definition of property. A property has been defined by three axioms and a definition of ideal content. The axiom of ideal content says that the identity of a property is fully determined by its ideal content. The axiom of non-emptiness, in turn, says that a property exists if and only if there is a possible state of affairs in which it can be exemplified. The last group of axioms talks about the relation of abstractness, which orders properties according to their degree of generality.
2. Definition of negative properties. Negative properties (or: lacks) have been defined as equally basic as positive properties. This is evidenced by the analysis of the concepts of being and non-being and of assertion and negation. It shows that these are just two ways of saying the same thing.
3. Definition of individual properties. Individual properties have been defined as maximally concrete properties and such that they can have at most one instance. The relationship between an object and its individual property has been defined in such a way that the fact that an object has any property implies that it also has its individual property. From the fact that individual properties are maximally concrete, it follows that all properties of an object are its necessary properties.
4. Definition of relations. Relations have been defined as dependent on the properties of the objects they connect. This understanding of relations is justified by an analysis of Russell's paradox for relations.
5. Definition of identity. On the basis of the theory of individual properties, Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles was justified. Then, on the basis of the thesis about the non-existence of independent relations, this principle was extended to the statement that if objects differ in anything, they are different.
6. Construction of a property model. A simple model for the theory of properties was presented, in which properties are represented by alternatives of sentences. This model was used to analyze Russell's paradox for properties. In its light, this paradox was solved by rejecting the so-called radical self-reference.

In the second part of the work, I focused on researching what is most fundamental. In philosophy, the first principle was most often called Being or Unity. In this part, I justified that the more appropriate name for this first principle is Unity. Unity has been defined as a maximally simple principle, and therefore containing the minimum possible amount of information. In this part, I also proved that:

1. Unity is simple: it cannot be a combination of many principles, nor have any internal structure.
2. Unity is unique: there cannot be many principles with the minimum possible amount of information.
3. There is nothing that is not one.
4. The One is not Being: the opposite of Being is Non-being, and Unity is not.
5. The One emanates: it is not possible that only The One exists and nothing else.

In the third part, I focused directly on the issue of transcendentals. Transcendentals are principles with unlimited scope. In the classical theory of transcendentals, they were understood as properties and coined from the laws of logic. In this part, I criticized this approach and justified that transcendentals are not properties. Then I presented a theory of transcendentals based on the following theses:

1. Transcendentals are principles that cannot have counterexamples. Everything must fulfill them.
2. There are many transcendentals (not one), because there are different, mutually irreducible ontological categories.

As a result of ontological analyzes based on previous findings, I identified and justified the existence of six transcendentals. These are namely:

1. Relationality: Every x must be in some relation.
2. Strong Relationality: Every x must be in some relation to every y .
3. Similarity: Every x is similar to every y in some way.
4. Individuality: Every x is individual.
5. Exemplification: Every x must exemplify something.
6. Strong exemplification: Every x is maximally defined.

At the end of the considerations summarized here, I would like to note that the proposed project certainly remains open. Other philosophical theories that take categories other than properties as basic may serve to discover new transcendentals. The main achievement of this work - it seems - is that it distinguished myriads of different phenomena that hide one-argument predicates. Thanks to this, it became visible that certain potentially paradoxical properties (e.g. exemplification) are not properties, and Russell's Relation is not a relation. Also thanks to this, a theory of properties was possible, in which, through the axiom of non-emptiness and the justification that negative properties are as fundamental as positive ones, it was possible to demonstrate the fundamental difference between properties and transcendentals. By adhering to not mixing properties, relations and transcendentals, the formation of transcendentals from predicates such as "identical to itself" was also avoided.

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