

summary

In this work I tried to present the concept of naturalism contained in the views of Ch. Taylor and the criticism the author gives to this position. I have pointed out what naturalism is, how Taylor understands this position and the accusations he makes against it. I stated that the author strives to show the deficiencies of naturalism, both as a methodological concept and in the broadly understood reflection on the phenomenon of human being. Of course, it would be a misunderstanding to completely omit the quantitative, utilitarian, or obvious biological determination resulting from the natural constitution of the homo sapiens species in the consideration of human nature. In all aspects, which I showed in the following chapters, the naturalistic interpretation best expressed in the formula: "man is nothing more than", presents itself as erroneous in so far as it claims exclusivity - as a leading and exhaustive way of explaining the meaning of culture, history, art and all manifestations of human significant activity. In the light of Taylor's arguments, the methodological directive ordering the explanation of the products of human culture as if they belonged to the subject of natural science research is completely unacceptable.

I pointed out the Taylor's current significant influence on the hermeneutic philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer, treated as a distant continuation of Kant's transcendentalism. With some interpretation, transcendentalism, not spiritualism, is the essential opposite of naturalism. The dynamics of narrative, dialogue, identity formation follow the scheme of the hermeneutic circle, where the given content is never given in advance like a minted coin, but is established by the process of its own becoming.

While analyzing fragments of Sources of Subjectivity, I pointed to the Augustian turn towards the interior, which in Descartes's thought resulted in the search for certainty through subjective cogito analysis. Paradoxically, the way to obtain certainty about what the external led through the interior and thus formed a two-component model of subject and object. This is how the model of an uninvolved observer, fundamental for naturalism, was born - which, striving for its own credibility, must cleanse itself of all subjective inclusions, while referring to the object, to make it a "sterile preparation" extracted from the context of actions irrelevant from the perspective of the organization of the experiment. This is how I gain confidence in myself, and the credibility of the object in the assumption of possible idealization - the purity of the conditions of the experiment.

In the chapter devoted to Locke's philosophy I showed the genesis of the concept of a punctual self, which for itself can be an object of cognition on a par with other subjects. He has

privileged access to himself, but this does not fundamentally change the position of "observer and observed". Self like a king in an auditorium accepts ideas arising from sensory stimuli. In this way the concept of mind as a set of information is born.

In the chapter devoted to the perspectives of neuroscience, I analyzed the consequences of the naturalistic concept of self in the context of the latest products of computer science and robotics as well as attempts to artificially generate consciousness. According to anti-naturalists, there is no artificial mind and never will be, while the so-called Artificial intelligence is already manifesting at the level of a pocket calculator and does not inspire more serious philosophical inquiries. An object equipped with this artificial intelligence can sometimes show high efficiency (e.g. play chess better than a man), but it never deserves to be called a conscious being. As stated in the above chapters of my dissertation, a human being is a self-narrative being, self-interpreting, establishing his identity in a self-description taking place in networks of conversations with significant others. These features are constitutive for a man, not the efficiency of accounting, sorting or imitation, which are available for ever more perfect machines.

I also tried to describe the role that Protestantism had played in shaping modern consciousness. The disenchantment of the world, which ultimately resulted in late medieval nominalism and theological voluntarism, had a significant impact on the dissemination of the mechanistic model of the physical universe. This was one of the premises of the Protestant praise of ordinary life.

The chapter devoted to discussions with economic reductionism concerned primarily the emphasis on the mutual nature of the interaction between culture and the economic conditions in which it develops. Naturalism focuses on absolutizing the economic factor - adopting the thesis of economic reductionism. Taylor opposes the unidirectional recognition of the relationship between what is "spiritual" and what is "material" and assigns an exclusive role to factors of an economic nature.

The chapter in which I focus on the concept of a person concentrates on showing an anti-naturalistic approach to the issue of human personal existence. According to Taylor, being a person is not only about the ability to act in physical space, but primarily on the understanding and interpretation of senses and making judgments and moral choices. In the perspective of Taylor's reflections, personality is primarily the ability to self-interpret, recognize values and autonarrative participation of the dialogical community, in networks of conversations with the so-called significant others.

The theory of meaning proposed by Taylor, presented in the next chapter, assumes the original character of invocation as opposed to the commonly accepted concept of representation. According to the latter, naming is a type of labeling. However, Taylor points to the primary nature of the invocation. To name someone, you must first recognize him, notice him. In turn, recognition presupposes seeing value. Being unnoticed means no recognition. An appeal by name can be like a call from non-existence. Recall is always the initial acceptance of the presence of someone or something. A similarity can be seen in this with Heidegger's aesthetic concept of truth, which is somewhat a statement of presence that precedes the question of certainty. To give meaning, name by name, we must pre-accept the presence of what is called. There must therefore already be a common horizon within which the one who names and what is named are found.

Important to Taylor's anti-naturalistic concept of man are his reflections on art. In the final chapters I tried to show the artist's perception of the artist as a model carrier and creator of the highest cultural values had. In addition to deism and naturalism, Taylor points to expressiveness as the third most important spiritual formation of modernity manifesting in art. The artist became a model of an authentic man. The artist emerges from an unknown reality project and uses a more subtle language, as it is given the power to re-name things and create new worlds. As it is shown, it is a beating source of meaning in opposition to the recipients of ready meanings.