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Transformation of the European security system in the context of current geopolitical challenges

Abstract

The article considers the issue of the modernization of the European system of security in the context of contemporary geopolitical challenges, especially the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation. The formation of the system of European security, taking into account the multi-dimensionality and the functionality of the system is analysed in the article, and the factors of threats and challenges that determine its modern functioning are indicated.

The authors draw attention to the inefficiency of the European security system, its problems and possible avenues of reform. The main institutions of the European system of security are analysed: NATO (specifically the special contribution of this structure in ensuring peace and security on the European continent, paying particular attention to the experience and strength of this highly organized trans-Atlantic military-political organisation); The European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (reasons for its emergence and development, those advantages and disadvantages which emerged at the time of its inception, the transformation of the CFSP under the Treaty of Lisbon and its prospects. Particular attention is devoted to the issue of its effectiveness in the context of the new threats to regional and global security); the OSCE (its main tasks and functions, achievements and problems).

The authors propose possible ways of modernization of European security system, namely a review of relations with those countries which refuse to recognize the agreements governing the relations in the field of security; strengthening the NATO-EU relations; work out new strategic documents in the field of security and defence which correspond to modern security challenges in Europe; total reorganization of the OSCE;

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and the use of regional and sub-regional organizations for the purpose of strengthening the European security system.

**Key words:** European security system, NATO, the European Union, Common Foreign and Defence Policy, the OSCE, Ukraine, Russian Federation

**Introduction**

Modern international relations are characterized by transformations at all levels caused by the global interdependence of states and nations. Despite the objectivity of globalization, the European countries involved in its processes face a range of problems. Their well-being and stability depend on the settlement of these issues, which, in turn, requires the maintenance of international security and, given the dynamism of global transformations, the search for new approaches to its implementation.

In terms of the escalation of permanent political, diplomatic, cultural, ideological, economic and military confrontation on the European continent linked directly with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which started in 2014 with the illegal armed seizure of the territory of Ukraine (the Crimea) and its accession to Russia, and later the hybrid Russian aggression against Ukraine in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, this led the European security system and the system of international relations as a whole to the sharp exacerbation of a latent crisis. Confrontation between the most powerful geopolitical players – the United States, NATO and the EU on one hand and the Russian Federation on the other – for the first time since the end of the “cold war” has revealed unsolved problems and failures in the politics of “Western democracies”. Russian military aggression against Ukraine has become the biggest challenge to the European security system and affected fundamental issues of European and global security.

Besides the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, Europe nowadays faces the menace of terrorism, extremism and flows of immigrants from Islamic states. They showed that the current system of international security is barely able to respond to these challenges. Assistance to the countries in the fight against terrorism and extremism is largely in bilateral or block formats. The opportunities of the international security system to respond to challenges to the economic, information, and resource and humanitarian security of individual countries seem to be insufficient and limited.
Russia's actions against Ukraine undermined regional stability in countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Caspian basin, creating a challenge for NATO as a key element of European security. After the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the fears of most countries of Central and Eastern Europe have found justification. Consequently they requested an increase in the protection of the Eastern flank of EU and, most importantly to increase the NATO presence. Nowadays the process of strengthening its eastern borders is underway, which demonstrates that NATO is fully committed to its obligations.

Taking into account current geopolitical challenges the following question arise: 1) is the existing European security system effective and if not in what ways may it be reformed?; 2) how the Ukrainian-Russian conflict affected the European security system?; 3) how can regional and sub-regional alliances strengthen it?

The place of the key institutions in the European security system

Security was and is one of the most important aspects in the functioning of international relations. The term “security” historically derives from the Latin word securitas – carelessness, negligence, peace of mind, freedom from fear, danger, peace, self-confidence (Słownik łacińsko-polski: 700). The modern definition of the term “security” outlines security primarily as the state of confidence, calm, support and the feeling that means protection from threats and dangers.

During the twentieth century many experts (mostly representatives of the realism (neorealism) – R. Betts (“The Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar Era”), K. Waltz (“Theory of International politics”), C. Gray (“The Arms Race Phenomenon”), H. Morgenthau (“Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”), J. Mearsheimer (“Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, The False Promise of International Institutions”), R. Rosecrance (“International Relations: Peace or War?”) and others rather fruitfully researched different aspects of military strategy, defence policy, nuclear parity etc. that actually make up the concept of "security". At the end of the 1970s, new theoretical studies where "security" is no longer seen as primarily a military term (a position supported by representatives of liberal and neoliberal international relations theory such as B. Buzan (“People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era”), R. Zięba
They began to realize that the term “security” is more comprehensive and not only includes military, but also political, economic, scientific, technological, information, environmental, ideological, cultural and humanitarian aspects.

In order to ensure and strengthen the external security of member states of the international community, a system of international security based on a system of obligations, guarantees and opportunities for its subjects has been created.

Among various systems of international security, the following should be singled out:

– Global (an example of such a system was a bipolar world with a system of deterrence and confrontations that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States);

– Regional, based on specific institutions in a particular region (they are the three institutions in Europe – the EU, the OSCE, NATO);

– Sub-regional, the priority of which is not military security, but the development of economic relations (such as, the Visegrad Group, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, etc.);

– Bilateral agreements, which cover military-political and economic issues and are the lower basic level of the security system in Europe.

In general, the structure of the European security system includes: the United Nations (UN); NATO; The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); The European Union (EU); The Council of Europe.

However, despite the relatively multidivisional structure of the European security system, it should be noted that the actual security tasks in Europe belong to three organizations - 1) NATO (including EU member-states, and also states outside it), 2) the European Union itself (closely cooperates with NATO on defence issues), 3) OSCE (includes European, Asian and North American countries).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO's role in the new conditions or threats to international and European security is greatly increasing and it has become the foundation
of European security architecture. The most important and enduring purpose of NATO, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to defend the freedom and security of all its members through political and military means. The Alliance commits to ensure a lasting peaceful order in Europe; however, achieving that goal may be at risk due to the crises and conflicts that arise inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

Western European countries which, from the late 1940s, were developing in the conditions of political, economic and military support from the United States, used that opportunity to save resources in the creation of a united continental security system and preferred to transfer this function to the Alliance, focusing on socio-economic reconstruction and the development of integration processes. NATO had to solve two strategic objectives: 1) to defend Europe from possible continental conflict; 2) to confront the USSR. After the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s the Euro-Atlantic community had to transform in the face of new geopolitical realities. At the NATO summit in Brussels in 1994, it was decided to develop the European Security and Defence system within the Alliance and it led to the achievement of practical arrangements under which the Alliance was able to support European military operations performed by the Western European Union. Later, at the meetings of defence ministers and foreign ministers of NATO member-states in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996 and at the NATO Summit in Madrid in 1997, decisions were made to strengthen the development of cooperation in that sphere. So, the Western European Union (established by seven European states allied with the United States during the Cold War) simultaneously developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO. European countries – the members of the Alliance recognized that in the process of achieving a real European military capability it is important to avoid unnecessary duplication of command structures, planning staffs and military assets which are already held by NATO. Arrangements for cooperation between NATO and the WEU reached in 1991–2000 laid the foundation for further development of relations between NATO and the EU and in December 16, 2002 “the Declaration on the European security and defence policy between NATO and the EU” was signed, which set out the political principles of cooperation and assured the EU access to the mechanisms for planning, capabilities and assets of NATO. Both organizations “welcomed the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management, founded on shared values, the
indivisibility of security and determination to tackle the challenges of the new Century” (EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP 2002: 1). After a few months NATO and the European Union filled this strategic partnership with the content agreeing on coordinated actions, particularly the exchange of confidential information and cooperation on crisis management, mainly through the "Berlin Plus Arrangements".

The new century brought new and varied tasks for the Alliance. Today, Alliance members, particularly Poland and the Baltic States remain concerned about the possibility that regional disputes or attempts at political intimidation could undermine security along its borders. The illegal annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation and military aggression in the east of Ukraine forced NATO to take steps to strengthen security on its eastern flank. In particular, this was one of the leading themes of the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, where the allies placed collective defence back as the primus inter pares among NATO’s three core tasks (the other two being crisis management and cooperative security) and it was decided to strengthen the military presence of the US and NATO in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland (Major 2015: 2) and at the Warsaw summit (June, 2016) the Alliance agreed to deploy up to four thousand soldiers in the Baltic countries and Poland and enhance the measures of operational and combat training of NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the region (Shlapak, Johnson 2016: 8). This shows that NATO is fully committed to its obligations towards its member-states and now can be considered as the main instrument to ensure Europe’s security and stability. As NATO and the European Union share key security challenges it is vital nowadays to increase practical cooperation in different areas that would lead to more favourable outcomes for both.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict may become a powerful incentive to spread the influence of NATO on the global stage. The Alliance may find the role of its military remains in Europe, resorting to the functions of deterrence of war in Europe. This will mean the need for reorientation of its military power to perform the complex tasks of defence and increase of readiness to deal with broad strategic confrontation. It is especially necessary for the defence of Central and Eastern Europe. All this requires substantial rethinking. NATO needs to reconsider collective defence in its current form, yet in a different setting and find the answer to new geopolitical realities and challenges. Possible ways of meeting these challenges are a combination of the foundations of collective, cooperative security and crises management. That is why it is important
not only to implement the programme adopted at the 2014 Wales Summit, but also preserve its internal unity and the ability of the member-States to meet their obligations.

The EU and its Common Security and Defence Policy

The European Union (EU) is a unique partnership in which member states have pooled sovereignty in certain policy areas and harmonized laws on a wide range of economic, social, and political issues. In addition, the EU has taken steps to develop common foreign and security policies, has sought to build common internal security measures and is largely viewed as a success story and cornerstone of European stability and prosperity (Archick 2016: 2). Currently, however, the EU faces a variety of political and economic challenges, including terrorism attacks, the rise of extremist movements and persistently high unemployment in many EU countries. Such factors are complicating the EU’s ability to deal with a multitude of internal and external challenges (the migration and refugee crisis; Brexit; a heightened terrorism threat and aggressive policy of the Russian Federation). However, one may contend that there is a chance that the multiple crises currently facing the EU could produce some beneficial EU reforms, encourage further political and economic integration, and ultimately transform the bloc into a more effective and cohesive entity(Archick 2016: 2).

The main instrument of the EU, as stated in the Treaty on European Union, to “ensure the Union's capacity for operational actions based on civil and military means” (p. 1, Art. 42) is the European Security and Defence Policy. Officially launched at the EU summit in Cologne in June 1999 it was a logical continuation of the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The impetus for the deepening of cooperation of the Member-States in the field of security and defence was the crisis in Kosovo, which is why the EU Member-States - since late 1998 started to make their own intensive integration and political efforts in the field of security and defence. So, at the session of the European Council in Cologne, the Heads of Member-States and the Heads of the Governments embarked on building the European Security and Defence Policy, based on the following objectives: strengthening the capacity of the EU in the areas of peace, forming capacity of the EU in the military field for conflict prevention and crisis management within the “Petersberg tasks” as well as assigning the
necessary tasks of the WEU to the “second pillar” of the EU (foreign jurisdiction and security), the prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter (Fesenko 2010: 3). This, in turn, required the enhancement of military capabilities of the Member-States. Also, the EU Member-States tried to intensify this process within the Western European Union (WEU). But the result of the pan-European debate was the understanding of the feasibility to accumulate the efforts and opportunities within the EU policy. For the WEU it meant the actual structural and functional dissolution in the CSDP.

At the summit of the European Council in Nice in December 2000, the Heads of the Member-States and the Heads of the Governments completed the formation of the CSDP structures responsible for security and defence, the concept of which was developed at the Cologne summit. Decisions are usually made by the EU Council. The structural unit which is responsible for this is the General Affairs & External Relations Council, whose membership is made up of foreign ministers (Shatun 2014: 63). The European Security Strategy, adopted December 12, 2003, defined the new global challenges the international community was facing and therefore the main threats to European security. These primarily include: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organized crime. According to certain threats specific goals were outlined that Europe should strive to protect its own security: responding to the threats; establishment of mechanisms for prevention and response, including in the sphere of active crisis management and international cooperation; building of security in the neighbourhood; response to threatening tendencies in the neighbourhood to prevent and avoid conflicts and crises; creation of an international order based on effective multilateral cooperation; active cooperation with other influential players in the international arena, particularly with influential international organizations (Snihyr 2010).

The Strategy also calls for the intensification of EU foreign policy efforts by improving the potential of opportunities and improving coordination. The document stresses the need to strengthen international institutions and international law, with special emphasis on the preventive character of all EU instruments, and at the same time the use of military force as the last resort for conflict prevention and crisis management is not excluded.

With the entry into force of “the Lisbon Treaty” on December 1, 2009, which made appropriate changes to the founding treaties of the EU, the
post of the President of the European Union was introduced. He heads the European Council and represents the EU in the sphere of common foreign and security policy, not overlapping the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. To implement the adopted decisions of a number of executive bodies the following bodies were set up: Office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Political and Security Committee; Military Committee; EU Military Staff. The key provision of the Lisbon Treaty is a mutual defence clause, which obliges to provide assistance and support in cases “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” (Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Art. 42). This clause is very similar to Article V of the Washington Treaty. This is the commitment to collective defence in case of a military attack against any of the Member-States, as well as provisions on mutual defence commitment of the EU members in case of a terrorist attack, natural or man-made disasters.

After the reform of the Lisbon Treaty the option for a categorical statement that the Union carries out its activities in the international arena only in two directions - the Community’s foreign policy and the CSDP was removed. The main issues of the first direction are the issues of international cooperation in the economic and social spheres, including science, culture and environmental protection. And the main issues of the CSDP, respectively, include any issues of international relations that do not include a foreign policy competence of the EU. They include, in particular, issues of international peace and security (Margaras 2010: 7).

The competencies of the EU in CSDP are correlated by the obligation of the Member States "actively and unreservedly support the CSDP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and comply with the Union’s action in this area". The Member States “shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity”. They “shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Art. 24 p. 3).

However, the CSDP contains a number of drawbacks in the sphere of international relations:
Firstly, although mainly common foreign policies of Member-States is maintained within this formation, there is also a shadow EU foreign policy, which focuses on small matters or issues, where Member States do not have the required tools, or the EU offers some advantages compared to national or NATO-approach;

Secondly, there is strategic uncertainty or division of opinions at the level of States Parties. For example, the EU interferes in some conflict, while in others it does not. This leads to the fact that the governments of Member States only partially support some CSDP missions. The reasons for EU intervention might be either its desire to excel as a global player, or to defend the national interests of individual member countries at the European level;

Thirdly, this is a weak institutional environment (a system of decentralized international cooperation), as reflected in the unanimity rule. This is especially true of some countries, which tend to block progress at all levels of the EU, even if a clear majority is in favour of actions.

Fourthly, this is a lack of an authorized supervision body, which monitors the implementation of works in compliance with the goals, etc.

The recent statement by Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission President, about the need for the creation of an EU army immediately provoked a strong reaction and lively discussions among world political and expert journalistic circles. “We have a lot to thank the Americans for... but they won't look after Europe's security forever”, Juncker said in November 2016. “We have to do this ourselves, which is why we need a new approach to building a European security union with the end goal of establishing a European army” (Deutsche Welle, 10.11.2016). Juncker’s position, however, is neither unique nor sensational for the EU. This policy wording is formally written in the Treaty of Lisbon, and its implementation has become even more urgent in the context of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, and threats from the eastern neighbour to the rest of Europe. However, experts’ attention to Juncker’s statement was exacerbated due to the direct use by such a high level politician – the President of the European Commission – of the term “European army”, which should be understood as the united armed forces of the European Union.

Nowadays the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has actually become a new springboard for competition of the EU and the Russian Federation for spheres of influence. The desire to restore its sphere of influence on
the European continent has become important to the Russian Federation. A period of “political and economic domination” and control over “zones of exceptional geopolitical interests” began in relations between the EU and Russia. The European Union began to noticeably tend to the Euro-Atlantic vector of development and possible creation of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States. This also led to underestimation by the USA and the EU of the situation of the former Soviet Union states, including Ukraine, and Russia’s imperial ambitions. They obtained the status of relatively affluent buffer areas with prospects of democratic development. The USA and Western European countries actually “gave” Russia the territories of its traditional geopolitical influence (except the Baltic states).

Only because of the tragedy of the “Boeing 777” liner in July, 2014 over the Donetsk region, and then the entry of regular units of the Russian Federation Armed Forces into the territory of Ukraine, did the EU Council after continued hopes for appeasement of the aggressor by means of diplomacy take the decision to impose system sanctions (the so-called sanctions of the “third wave”). Subsequently, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced the termination of the partnership relation of the EU with Russia.

However, it should be understood that the EU in the sphere of security cannot offer Ukraine anything but the traditional methods of “soft power”, the prospects for economic assistance and anti-Russian sanctions that will have long-term consequences, tough statements and public condemnation of the actions of the aggressor.

As for the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it should be stated that a series of diplomatic arrangements have been made at the international level with the participation of the USA and the EU, which, however, proved to be ineffective and inefficient in practice. For instance, one of them was „Geneva format” of negotiations – the four-party negotiations held on settlement of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine with the participation of senior diplomatic representatives of Ukraine, the EU, the USA and Russia in Geneva on April 17, 2014. After hours of discussions, agreements were reached at the meeting on the release of the seized buildings in Ukraine and amnesty for the protesters. The USA, the EU and Russia pledged to support the Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE, which has to play a leading role in promoting the Ukrainian authorities and local communities in the immediate implementation of measures aimed at the
de-escalation of the situation. Due to the fact that the parties in the conflict were on the verge of full-scale war, a new attempt to resolve the conflict was the talks in the “Normandy Format” in Minsk or “Minsk – 2”. A Package of Measures was concluded the results of which aimed at implementation of the Minsk Agreements. While the “Geneva format” of talks includes the USA, the EU, Ukraine and Russia, the participants of the “Normandy format” are Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia. There are ongoing debates until now, which format of talks – “Geneva” or “Normandy”, is better to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The EU also implements its support to Ukraine in the following areas: support in implementing economic and political reforms; the EU is the main source of economic aid to Ukraine via a variety of institutions – the IMF, World Bank and others; sanctions by which European politicians expect to put pressure on Russia. However, we can state that for the EU it is rather difficult to combine the positions of its Member States on the situation in Ukraine. For example, among the opponents of sanctions one most often can cite the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, France, Hungary and Italy. On the other hand, some experts doubt the effectiveness of the EU economic mechanisms, at least, if applied to the current Russian regime.

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (before 1994 – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) is one of the most important elements in the European security architecture. It has to act in the following directions: political (including security aspects), economic (market economy, social justice), ecological (environmental protection) and “human” (human rights and development of democratic institutions) on the basis of generally accepted principles. The political dimension of the OSCE activities concentrates not only on the general principles of the relations development among the countries, but also includes more specific areas such as strengthening trust among member-states, arms control, prevention and resolution of conflicts and combating transnational threats. The need for strengthening the trust among European states was clearly understood by politicians taking into account ambiguous processes during the “Cold War”, which included permanent crisis in relations between two warring military-political blocs and constantly growing arms race and armed conflicts in various
regions of the world. The high level of international tension could only have been removed through dialogue and the implementation of effective measures of confidence.

After 1990 the OSCE acquired more well-established organizational forms, sent observer missions to different elections and held field operations (for instance, Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine) in Europe to monitor the situation and the possibilities of peaceful settlement of these conflicts. The OSCE has accumulated some experience in such activities as early crisis prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The main OSCE achievement was coordination of the adoption of the Treaty on reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which established quantitative restrictions for European countries on the main types of conventional weapons. OSCE tried to carry out mediation or monitoring in the conflict zones in the territories of the new independent states of the CIS – in Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya.

However, the results of the OSCE performance are not always effective. For example, OSCE failed to resolve the problems in Kosovo, where the organization was involved prior to the NATO action in 1999. The activity of the OSCE mission in Ukraine today is rather controversial. On the one hand, by assessing the actions of international organizations in terms of Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, some analysts highlight the positive effects of the OSCE activity, while on the other hand—mainly because of participation of Russian experts in the OSCE, their assessments are questioned.

After the change of power in February 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the role of OSCE significantly increased with regard to easing tensions between Ukraine and Russia and the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. In connection with the referendum in Crimea on secession from Ukraine, which was not agreed with the Ukrainian authorities, the government appealed to the OSCE to urgently send a monitoring mission to Ukraine to track the facts of aggression and illegal external interference. On March 21, 2014, the OSCE Permanent Council on the basis of the request of the Ukrainian government decided to establish the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, the mandate of which extends throughout the state. The purpose of the OSCE mission in Ukraine is to maintain dialogue and reduce tension in the country. However, many analysts are rather sceptical today about the activities of the OSCE mission, emphasizing the limitations of its activities. However, it should be
understood that the OSCE is not a peacekeeping force, and its SMM representatives are unable to control the situation along the entire length of the border of the conflict zone.

At the same time it is worth pointing out that in addition to its direct activity in East Ukraine, the OSCE is implementing various programs and projects, particularly in the area of legal reform, education, human rights, combating organized crime, terrorism and human trafficking, reforming armed forces, environment protection, etc.

Therefore, as we see, the purpose of the OSCE activity is different from NATO. First and utmost, it is conflict prevention, crisis management, compliance with the rights of people, refugees, arms control, economic development, political reforms, etc. Therefore, the OSCE is not an organization that guarantees safety, rather the one that helps to create the conditions for security. Instead, NATO, unlike the OSCE, has the real tools of force impact and coercion to peace.

To continue to play a useful role in resolving this issue and in easing tensions between Russia and the West, the OSCE needs to adjust its way of working and strengthen its toolbox.

The Role of the Baltic-Black Sea region in the European Security System

One of the ways to strengthen the European security system is to support regional initiatives. The Baltic-Black sea region could become one of them as it belongs, in geographic and geopolitical terms, not only to the sphere of world geostrategic interests, but also is influenced by them. Countries belonging to this region have a very favourable economic and geographical position which is important both from economic and political, and security perspective. The idea of creating a Baltic-Black Sea region was reflected in many academic works by European and Ukrainian researchers, and in the declarations of famous politicians. In 2015 the idea of the Baltic-Black Sea alliance gained new meaning after the newly elected President of Poland Andrzej Duda repeatedly stated that he intends to invite the heads of the Central and Eastern European countries to create a “partnership alliance of states” from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic Seas. The creation of such an Alliance is now very important from different perspectives: 1) transit location of the Baltic-Black Sea region is in the geopolitical interests of the great powers and geo-economic blocs. Most initiators of the creation of the region see it as a regional project which has economical and transit
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Importance. However, it is clear that the economy can function properly only in a prosperous security environment. In a broad interpretation the Baltic-Black Sea region includes political and strategic components – defence, economic development and communicative facilities. This alliance must be a counterweight to the common external enemy – the Russian Federation, which is a real military threat in the region; 2) if the Baltic-Black sea union (alliance or confederation) appears on the political map of Europe, it has a favourable background for economic cooperation, which can be expressed in the common economic space, common energy, logistics and infrastructure projects that promote economic development. Restoration of transit transport, economic, energy, financial, trade and social cooperation between the Baltic and the Black Sea region will allow them to increase their economic potential and defence; 3) cooperation in the security and military spheres can become a good basis for the creation of a zone of stability between the EU and Russian Federation. The countries belonging to the Baltic-Black Sea basin can create on their borders impregnable fortification against the looming threat from the East. Maybe that threat will help the countries to reject any misunderstandings and overcome the existing obstacles that now prevent them from uniting in a new defence, economic and political union within the EU and NATO structure. Undoubtedly, such a union will make the EU stronger and improve the operational capabilities of NATO to protect its eastern borders.

However, there are some obstacles for the creation of the Baltic-Black Sea region and they include differences in the interpretation of some historical events and ethnocentric vision of the future of the region. Only mutual understanding and possible benefits for all of the countries-participants of this project can make it a reality and not only a declaration in the nearest future.

Conclusions

Considering the progress of a variety of threats and risks, the debate on changing the format of the European Security System as a whole has become relevant today, especially with a view to adapting it to the current crisis conditions in Europe and worldwide. However, the view that the European Security System has ultimately collapsed is quite controversial today. We believe these judgments are not justified. First of all, due to the fact that the European security system has been
constantly changing during its historical development depending on specific historical realities. Like any other system, the European Security System is now experiencing an evolution influenced by both external and internal factors of the up-to-date international system. The globalization processes, which are not objectively sustainable, should be considered a proof.

Therefore, it is advisable to speak only about changing the format of the European Security System. We should single out the following trends in this context:

– Review of relations with the countries which refuse to recognize the agreements governing the relations in the field of security (the Russian Federation being the first on the list);
– Make a clear distinction between internal and external challenges and problems, identify their priority. It is primarily about the fact that the Western countries have switched their focus from foreign policy to settling domestic problems caused by economic and migration crises, threats of terrorism and radicalization;
– Define a single structure to address security issues, giving it more powers, and adapt to difficult conditions of modern hybrid wars (many researchers have no doubt that it should be NATO);
– Strengthen cooperation between NATO and the EU;
– Strengthen the unity within the Alliance, particularly in the matter of strengthening its military presence and building military infrastructure on its eastern flank;
– Develop a roadmap of NATO's relationship with Russia, including finding ways to compel the RF to follow the rules of international law;
– NATO expansion;
– Development and adoption of new guidance documents in the field of security and defence, which would reflect today's situation in the world;
– Full restructuring of the OSCE as non-compliant with modern security requirements, included because of it lobbies for the benefit of one country (especially Russia);
– Integration of Russia into the European Security System only after it changes its political regime and peculiarities of foreign policy activities
– Support of regional initiatives such as the Baltic-Black Sea region.

At the same time, these trends are not exhaustive. They are mostly caused by the fact that the analysis of the current security and defence
policy of the EU makes it possible to argue that it does not contain a clear understanding of the situation in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Thus, the European Security System has travelled a long way since its formation and development. In its efforts to respond accordingly to various international processes, the European Security System has been structurally expanding for a long time. Therefore, its structure is rather complex. On the one hand, it provides clear powers to some of its structural units and thus ensure their functionality, while on the other hand – it leads to their ineffectiveness and has a negative impact on the system as a whole.

At the same time it should be noted that, on the one hand, the development of CSDP, which showed the desire of the European Union to acquire certain autonomy of action in the security space of Europe, does not promote political stability and NATO prospects, on the other hand – European countries as members of NATO are not interested in the full formation of another structural unit of the security policy. Moreover, the EU does not show the desire for independence in ensuring security on the European continent, the main role here is still assigned to NATO.

However, modern international processes, including terrorism, the policy of the RF towards post-Soviet states, conflicts in the Middle East, etc., are causing the need for changing the format of the European security system in order to adapt, prevent and handle crisis and new challenges.

Literature


Przemiany europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa w kontekście współczesnych wyzwań geopolitycznych

Streszczenie

W artykule rozważa się problem modernizacji europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa w kontekście współczesnych wyzwań geopolitycznych, zwłaszcza agresywnej polityki Federacji Rosyjskiej. Przeprowadzono analizę kształtowania systemu europejskiego bezpieczeństwa, biorąc pod uwagę wielowymiarowość i zdolność systemu, wyznaczono czynniki zagrożenia i wyzwań, które decydują obecnie o jego funkcjonowaniu.

Autorzy zwracają uwagę na nieefektywność europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa, jego problemy i możliwe sposoby jego reformowania. Przeanalizowano główne instytucje europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa: NATO (szczególny wkład tej struktury w gwarantowanie pokoju i bezpieczeństwa na kontynencie europejskim, z uwzględnieniem doświadczeń i potencjału tej wysoce zorganizowanej wojskowo-politycznej struktury transatlantyckiego bezpieczeństwa), Unię Europejską i jej Wspólną Politykę Zagraniczną i Bezpieczeństwa (powody powstania i rozwój WPZB EU, jej zalety i wady, które ujawniły się podczas jej stanowienia i realizacji, transformowanie WPZB na mocy Traktatu z Lizbony i perspektywy jej rozwoju). Szczególną akcent położono na kwestie jej efektywności w kontekście nowych zagrożeń regionalnego i globalnego bezpieczeństwa. W artykule uwzględniono także OBWE (jej główne zadania i funkcje, osiągnięcia i problemy).

Autorzy proponują możliwe kierunki modernizacji europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa, mianowicie reorientację stosunków z krajami, które odmawiają uznawania umów regulujących relacje w sferze bezpieczeństwa; wzmacnienie relacji NATO–UE; wypracowanie nowych strategicznych dokumentów dotyczących bezpieczeństwa i obrony, które odpowiałyby współczesnym wyzwaniom bezpieczeństwa europejskiego; całkowita reorganizacja OBWE; wykorzystanie regionalnych i subregionalnych organizacji w celach wzmacnienia bezpieczeństwa europejskiego.

Słowa kluczowe: europejski system bezpieczeństwa, NATO, Unia Europejska, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, OBWE, Ukraina, Federacja Rosyjska